Introductory Remarks by the Honorable Justice
Stewart G. Pollock* at Seton Hall University School of
Law '
Returning to Seton Hall University School of Law for the Health
Law & Policy Program's Symposium on "Proving Product Defect After
Products Liability" is like a
the Third Restatement of Torts:
homecoming. For years, Seton Hall has been like a second home for
me.
The length of my relationship with Seton Hall came to mind
when I reviewed the proposed Model Civil Jury Charge on Design
Defect.' The proposed charge is the work of our court's Model Civil
Jury Charge Committee. Included within the forty-three footnotes
supporting the charge is a reference to an article published in the
Seton Hall Law Review twenty-nine years ago. The article was written
by a young trial lawyer who, in the 1960s, was trying to make sense of
That lawyer, no longer
the emerging law of products liability.2
young, is still trying to make sense of products liability law. I know. I
wrote the article. As an additional reminder of the length of our
relationship, one of the bright young Seton Hall Law Review editors
who checked my research was a fellow named Ronald Riccio. I
wonder what ever happened to him? 3
Over the years, the School of Law has graciously extended to me
invitations to lecture and to judge moot court finals. More recently, I
have been privileged to chair the Health Law & Policy Committee,
the sponsor of today's symposium. Under the dynamic leadership of
Professors Kathleen Boozang and John Jacobi, Seton Hall University
Of Counsel, Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, L.L.P.; Associate
Justice, NewJersey Supreme Court (retired).
t Editor's Note: This address is based upon a presentation given at Seton Hall
University School of Law's Seventh Annual Health Law Symposium on February 12,
1999.
1 See NEWJERSEY MODELJURY CHARGE ON DESIGN DEFECT (Proposed Official Draft
1998).
See id. § 5.34(C)(4) n.2 (citing Stewart Pollock, Liability of a Blood Bank or
Hospitalfor a Hepatitis Associated Blood Transfusion in New Jersey, 2 SETON HALL L. REV.
47, 60 (1970)).
Ronald Riccio served as Dean of Seton Hall University School of Law from
1988 to 1999.
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School of Law has moved to fill a void in legal education in the New
Jersey-New York metropolitan area. Today's symposium is the most
recent of several that the Health Law & Policy Program has
sponsored.
The program for today's symposium states that I am to make
introductory remarks. I've attended enough symposia to appreciate
how little is expected of the speaker assigned to make such remarks.
No one expects an introductory speaker to say very much, and
everyone expects him to take very little time to say it.
My task is to help you make the transition from coffee and
danish pastry to products liability law. It's to give you time to put
down your coffee cup, pick up your pen, tune out the world, and
tune-in to the speakers. Still, the temptation to say something
substantive persists.
As we hear our speakers today, it might help to put their
comments in perspective by recalling how typically "American"
products liability law is. Products liability is a paradigm to illustrate
how law is made in the United States. Theoretically, the United
States is a common-law jurisdiction. Judge-made law remains the law
of the land. Unlike European and Latin American jurisdictions,
courts, not legislatures, are the basic sources of law. As time passes,
however, common-law and code jurisdictions draw closer to each
other.
In NewJersey, as throughout the United States, products liability
law started with the courts. It started thirty-nine years ago with the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors,4 which eliminated privity as a defense in cases involving the
sale of defective products that cause physical injury. The effect of
Henningsen, according to Dean Prosser, was "the most rapid and all
together spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts."5 With the enactment of the Products
Liability Act, 6 however, the New Jersey Legislature has supplanted the

courts as the primary source of products liability law. No one
questions the Legislature's power to enact such a law; even in a
common-law jurisdiction, the legislature may, subject to
constitutional limits, trump judicial decisions.
Making law in America depends, nevertheless, on more than the
judicial and legislative branches of government. A special feature of
4

32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

5

W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

(5th ed. 1984).
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C (West 1999).

§ 97, at 690

204

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:202

lawmaking in this country is the role of legal scholars and non-profit
organizations dedicated to the improvement of the law. The most
prominent of those organizations is the American Law Institute
(ALI). Eight years ago, the ALI revisited the law of products liability.
Its previous contribution, although extremely influential, was
After
confined to one section in the Second Restatement of Torts
seven years of review, some of it contentious, the ALI approved the
Restatement of Torts on Products Liability.8 The controversy that still
surrounds the Restatement of Torts on Products Liability typifies the
controversy that surrounds products liability law in general. 9 No
matter what else you might think about controversy, it produces good
symposia.
The various treatments by the courts, the legislatures, and the
ALI of just one issue, the state-of-the-art defense, demonstrates the
genius of the American system of making law. The selection of the
state-of-the-art defense in design defect cases as an illustration of
lawmaking necessarily limits the depth of the discussion.
Depending on where you stand, the high or low water mark of
state-of-the-art defense in New Jersey was Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.10 Briefly, in Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that the manufacturers of asbestos products were strictly liable
to persons who contracted asbestosis, even if the manufacturer had
In other words,
made the products as safely as it could.
manufacturers were strictly liable even if the product comported with
the state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture. Almost immediately,
the court realized the need to modify the holding. To this end, the
court identified the state-of-the-art defense as one element in the riskutility analysis. The court stated that the defense would still be
available except in asbestos cases and those involving products that
"are so dangerous and of such little use," such as dangerous toys,
"that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the
cost of liability of harm to others."" This holding confined the
elimination of the defense to the kind of cases that gave rise to
Beshada - asbestosis cases. Viewed charitably, the judicial treatment
of the state-of-the-art defense demonstrates the ability of the common
law to adapt, modify, and self-correct.
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

8 See RESTATEMENT

§ 402A (1965).

(THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1997).

See generally William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
and New Jersey Law - Not Quite Perfect Together, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2059 (1998).
9

:0 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).

1 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983).
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By the time the court straightened out its jurisprudence on the
state-of-the-art defense, however, the wind was up.
In 1987,
responding to lobbying from manufacturers, primarily tobacco and
pharmaceutical companies, the Legislature adopted the New Jersey
Products Liability Act."
Among the many provisions of this new
statute is one that constitutes the state-of-the-art defense as absolute.
If a manufacturer can show that there was no "practical and
technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the
harm without substantially impairing" the function of the product, it
is not liable for failing to provide an alternative design. 3 Under the
statute, state-of-the-art is no longer an element in risk-utility analysis;
instead it is an absolute defense. 4 Echoing the New Jersey Supreme
Court's concern about products that pose high risks and offer only
low utility, the Legislature created an exception to the state-of-the-art
defense for products that are "egregiously unsafe or ultrahazardous.' 5 Possible candidates for the exception include "Lawn
Darts," foot-long steel darts that children can throw at targets or each
other, a 150-volt "Quivering Lump Baton," advertised with the slogan
"reach out and touch someone," and a hand-held crossbow that
shoots bolts at forty-five miles per hour and can penetrate a
telephone book from twenty-five feet away.
The Third Restatement of Torts on Products Liability abandons
the term "state-of-the-art," but keeps the concept.
Under the
Restatement, a design is defective if the product could have been6
made safer "by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.'
Thus, a product is not defective if it could not have been made safer.
In one sense, the Restatement exceeds the Products Liability Act.
Under the Restatement, proof that the product could have been
made safer is an element of the plaintiffs case. 7 If the defendant can
show that no practical or feasible design existed, the plaintiff loses.
Although the substance of the Restatement is similar to New Jersey
case law, the burden of proof and the effect of proving compliance
with the state-of-the-art differs.
The Restatement acknowledges that some products for which no
reasonable alternative design exists should still, nonetheless, be
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See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (1999).
Id. § 2A:58C-3(a)(1).
See id. § 2A:58C-3(a).
Id. § 2A:58C-3(b)(1).
REsrATEMENT (THIRD) oFTORTs: PRODUcTs LIABILTY§ 2(b) (1997).

See id.
See id.
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removed from the market because "the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use . . .so substantially outweighs its negligible

social utility." 9 Consequently, on the issue of dangerous toys, New
Jersey case law, the Products Liability Act, and the Restatement are all
in accord.
Even those who disagree with the state-of-the-art defense as
articulated in the Products Liability Act and the Restatement, may
still applaud their attempts to provide a clearer and simpler
explanation of the defense. For the past twenty years, I, like Judge
Dreier and Judge Keefe, have reviewed jury charges in products
liability cases that juries, to put it politely, must have found difficult to
understand. My point is not to endorse or criticize the New Jersey
Products Liability Act or the Restatement, but merely to point out
how they illustrate the synergism of the judiciary, the legislature, and
the academy in the process of making law.
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Id. § 2 cmt. b.

